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The Price-Anderson Act:
Underwriting The Ultimate Tort
John V. Buffington*
I. Introduction
The accident at the Three Mile Island (TMI) Unit 2 nuclear
reactor on March 28, 1979, helped to revolutionize the public per-
ception of the risks inherent in the operation of nuclear power plants
and to focus attention on the vulnerability in the event of an accident
of the population living near such plants. President Carter ap-
pointed a special commission, headed by John Kemeny, President of
Dartmouth College, to conduct an investigation and file a report.
Eventually, the committee made forty-four specific recommenda-
tions;' President Carter rejected one, modified five and accepted
thirty-eight outright.2 Some recommendations were implemented
immediately, but the change of administrations in January 1980
ended serious consideration of some of the most significant recom-
mendations, including-the following: (1) The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) should be abolished and replaced with a new
agency headed by a single administrator. (2) Future nuclear plants
should be built in remote areas away from population centers.
(3) Nuclear plant operators should be trained at government-accred-
ited training centers. (4) Nuclear plants should be required to be
relicensed periodically, following public hearings and subject to the
outcome of inspections and performance reviews.
The recommendation currently considered to be most important
is that the NRC issue no new construction permits or operating
* B.A. 1969, J.D. 1972, University of Virginia. Professor Buflington is Visiting Re-
search Professor at the Center for the Study of Values, University of Delaware. The research
for this article was supported by the Center for the Study of Values, under a grant from the
Exxon Education Foundation. The views expressed are those of the author and do not neces-
sarily reflect the views of the Center or the Foundation.
1. See The President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, Report of the
President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island (1979) [hereinafter cited as Presi-
dent's Commission's Report].
2. See J. Kemeny, Saving American Democracy.- The Lessons of Three Mile Island, 82
TECH. REv. 65, 72 (1980). See also R. Pollard, After TMI." The Lesson Unlearned, Phila.
Inquirer, March 28, 1983, at A-9.
licenses in states lacking NRC-approved emergency plans for deal-
ing with nuclear accidents. All the risk projections prior to the TMI
accident were based in part on the assumption that, in the event of
an accident, most of the people in the surrounding area could be
evacuated. The occurrence of an accident in which an evacuation
was seriously considered all too dramatically revealed that, at least
in that case, no workable evacuation plan had existed. Later it
emerged that, in fact, only ten of the forty-three states at risk of nu-
clear emergencies had had plans in place at that time.3 In 1980,
Congress for the first time prohibited the issuance of new operating
licenses unless adequate state or local emergency plans are in place.4
Since then, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has attempted to
extend the congressional policy to plants already licensed and most
recently threatened to shut down Commonwealth Edison's Indian
Point-2 and the New York Power Authority's Indian Point-3 if ac-
ceptable plans were not submitted.'
The current emphasis on emergency planning is understanda-
ble, given the heightened level of public awareness of vulnerability,
but the tendency of that one issue to dominate the post-TMI discus-
sion of nuclear power is regrettable. In addition to serious consider-
ation of the rest of the agenda set forth in the Kemeny Commission
Report, another major undertaking awaits the attention of the Con-
gress: reconsideration of the statutory scheme that was created to
foster the growth of nuclear power, particularly the Price-Anderson
Act,6 which shifts most of the financial risk of a major nuclear power
plant catastrophe from the owners of the plant to the injured public.
This article discusses Price-Anderson's history and consequences
and attempts to show that the balance of the compromise that it
strikes between promotion of the nuclear industry and protection of
the public should be changed.
3. Nelkin, Some Social and Political Dimensions of Nuclear Power. Examplesfrom Three
Mile Island, 75 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 132, 138 (1981).
4. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization Act for 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-295, 94
Stat. 780. Section 109(a)(l) prohibited issuance of a license in the absence of a plan that com-
plied with NRC guidelines, but § 109(a)(2) waived the prohibition if the NRC found that a
noncomplying plan "provides reasonable assurance that the public health and safety is not
endangered by operation of the facility." The NRC now requires submission of "the appli-
cant's preliminary plans for coping with emergencies" as part of the application for a construc-
tion permit. 10 C.F.R. § 50.34(a)(10) (1983). The requirements for such plans are specified in
10 C.F.R. Part 50, app. E (1983). See also the Memorandum of Understanding Between Fed-
eral Emergency Management Agency and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 45 Fed. Reg.
82713 (1980).
5. N.Y. Times, May 6, 1983, at A-I. The NRC subsequently found that sufficient pro-
gress was being made on emergency planning and that the plants could continue to operate.
See id., June 10, 1983, at A-I.
6. Atomic Energy Damages Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2210) (1976).
II. Legislative History
The Atomic Energy Act of 19467 created the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC)8 and gave it the responsibility of overseeing the
atomic energy program originally developed by the United States
Army's Manhattan Engineer District. The 1946 Act created a gov-
ernment monopoly of the ownership of nuclear fuel. 9 It simultane-
ously created a tentative, rudimentary licensing system for nuclear
power plants, but prohibited the issuance of any licenses until ninety
days following the AEC's submission to Congress of a report that the
technology had become of practical value.'"
The 1946 Act also created the Joint Committee on Atomic En-
ergy," to consist of nine members from the House and nine mem-
bers from the Senate, which was to oversee the operation of the
AEC. As long as it existed, the Joint Committee enjoyed a unique
status, largely because of the perceived need to reduce the number of
members of Congress with access to highly sensitive information to
an absolute minimum. It was the only joint committee ever to have
been created by statute and the only one ever given authority to orig-
inate legislation.' 2
In 1953, faced with Russian development of the hydrogen bomb
and the need for a public statement on the dangers inherent in the
nuclear arms race, 13 President Eisenhower delivered to the United
Nations General Assembly the address which was to become known
as the "Atoms for Peace" speech, 14 which offered U.S. support for
international development of atomic energy "to provide abundant
electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world." The
speech was highly successful as political propaganda, although nu-
7. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755.
8. Id. § 2(a)(l).
9. Id. § 5; the phrase used in the 1946 Act is "fissionable materials," that is, uranium
235 and any other materials found by the AEC to be capable of releasing substantial quantities
of energy through nuclear fission.
10. Id. § 7(b).
11. Id. § 15(a).
12. Id. § 15(b). See J. Temples, The Politics ofNuclear Power: A Subgovernment in Tran-
sition, 8 POL. Sci. 239, 243 (1980); see also H. GREEN & A. ROSENTHAL, GOVERNMENT OF THE
ATOM-THE INTEGRATION OF POWERS (1963), a detailed account of the evolution of this ex-
traordinary institution [hereinafter cited as GREEN & ROSENTHAL].
13. See G. Mazuzan & J. Walker, Developing Nuclear Power in an Age ofEnergy Abun-
dance, 1946-1962, at 4 (paper presented at the Conference on Energy in American History,
Mountain Lake, Va. (Sept. 30-Oct. 3, 1982)) [hereinafter cited as Mazuzan & Walker]. P.
PRINGLE & J. SPIGELMAN, THE NUCLEAR BARONS 121 (1981); R. DIVINE, EISENHOWER AND
THE COLD WAR 110-14 (1981); Soapes, A Cold Warrior Seeks Peace. Eisenhower's Strategyfor
Nuclear Disarmament, 4 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 57-71 (1980).
14. Address by President Eisenhower Before the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, New York City (Dec. 8, 1953), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, D. D. EISENHOWER 1953, at 813, para. 256 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Eisenhower's Public Papers].
clear power was, in fact, far from the commercial viability that Ei-
senhower's offer implied.
President Eisenhower began implementing his rhetorical flour-
ish the next year by sending to Congress a package of revisions of
the Atomic Energy Act. Along with the package the President sent a
message urging that nuclear development was critical to the "destiny
of all nations" and was a means to "lead mankind into a new era of
progress and peace."' 5 Congress readily concluded that "the goal of
atomic power at competitive prices will be reached more quickly if
private enterprise, using private funds, is. . . encouraged to play a
far larger role in the development of atomic power"' 6 and conse-
quently passed the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,17 which superseded
the 1946 Act. Private possession of nuclear fuel was permitted for
the first time, subject to AEC licensing and regulation to protect the
public health and safety.1
8
Still dissatisfied with the pace of private investment in nuclear
power in 1956, the members of the Joint Committee on Atomic En-
ergy concluded that the problem was the unwillingness of the private
insurance industry to underwrite an unknown level of risk of liabil-
ity for the release of fission products into the atmosphere. The Dem-
ocratic members of the Joint Committee responded by drafting the
Gore-Holifield Bill, which would have had the AEC build six large-
scale reactors in various parts of the country. Gore-Holifield passed
the Senate but was rejected by the House in 1956.
The Republican majority of the Joint Committee and the Re-
publican-dominated AEC saw Gore-Holifield as a threat to their
belief
that publicly, cooperatively, and privately owned utilities engaged
in the sale of atomic energy and equipment manufacturers [were]
in a much better position than the Commission or its laboratories
to assess the economics of particular reactor concepts and to deter-
mine which ones [were] in the stage of development where the
construction of a prototype [was] a logical and appropriate step. 19
The commission submitted its own bill to Congress to create a gov-
ernment insurance program under which the operator of a nuclear
15. Special Message from President Eisenhower to the Congress Recommending
Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act (Feb. 17, 1954), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
OF THE UNITED STATES, D. D. EISENHOWER 1954, at 269, para. 38 (1960).
16. S. REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, 3456, 3459 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1699].
17. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2281 (1976)).
18. 42 U.S.C. 2073 (1976). The term "fissionable materials" was abandoned in favor of
"source material," meaning uranium and thorium and their ores, id. § 2014(2) and "special
nuclear material," meaning plutonium, enriched uranium, and any other nuclear fuel, id.
§ 2014(aa).
19. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Proposed Legislation for
Accelerating Civilian Reactor Program, S. 2725 and HR. 10805, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1956).
plant could buy as much insurance as it wanted, subject to denial of
coverage for bad faith, willful misconduct or gross negligence.2 °
That bill gradually evolved into one supported at first by the Repub-
licans on the Joint Committee and passed as the Price-Anderson
Act,2 ' the stated goals of which were to "protect the public and to
encourage the development of the atomic energy industry. 22
To those ends, the Act required the operator of a nuclear plant
to have private liability insurance, self-insurance or a combination of
the two 23 in an amount equal to the maximum coverage available
from private sources (at the time of the Act's passage, $60 million)
and mandated the further purchase of a $500 million government
indemnification policy.24 Liability for damages in excess of the sums
thus to be provided was expressly cut off.25 The issue of liability up
to the $560 million cap was implicitly left to be resolved under state
tort law26 in the event of a nuclear accident. Once liablity was estab-
lished, the federal court with bankruptcy jurisdiction over the site of
the accident would apportion all available funds from private insur-
ance and/or federal indemnification among all claimants.
27
The Joint Committee considered the need for a federal indem-
nification program to be temporary: with operating experience, the
insurance industry would gain confidence that the risks from nuclear
power were finite and would take over the whole insurance responsi-
bility.28 Only plants licensed prior to August 1, 1967, therefore, were
to be eligible for federal indemnification. In 1965, however, with the
expiration of the indemnification program approaching, operating
experience remained very limited; just ten plants had been com-
pleted, and one of them had suffered a partial meltdown and was
20. See Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Governmental Indem-
nity for Private Licensees and AEC Contractors Against Reactor Hazards, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
44 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Governmental Indemnity].
21. See supra note 6. The Gore-Holifield bill was but one of many cases of Democratic
pressure on the Republican administration to step up the pace of atomic power development.
In the 1956 elections, for example, Democratic vice-presidential candidate Estes Kefauver,
Joint Committee Chairman Clinton Anderson and the Democratic platform all criticized the
AEC's pace in developing nuclear power. See Mazuzan & Walker, supra note 13, at 9-10 and
the sources cited therein.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2012(i) (1976).
23. Id. § 2210(b) (1976).
24. Id. § 2210(c) (1976).
25. Id. § 2210(e) (1976).
26. S. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 296].
Therein, it was observed that
there is no interference with the State law until there is a likelihood that the damages
exceed the amount of financial responsibility required together with the amount of
the indemnity. At that point the Federal interference is limited to the prohibition of
making payments through the State courts and to prorating the proceeds available.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (1976).
28. The Joint Committee observed that "during the 10-year period it is hoped that there
will be enough experience gained so that the problems of reactor safety will be to a great extent
solved and the insurance people will have had experience on which to base a sound program of
their own." See S. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1957).
scrapped after producing power for only a few months.29
Moreover, as the plants in place were very small, operating ex-
perience with them would be of very little applicability to the 575 to
850 mW units which had been ordered in 1962 and 1963 but were
not yet completed. The industry scaled up the size of the units so
quickly that sound risk assessment was elusive. Nevertheless, pri-
vate insurers did agree to increase their coverage, by twenty-five per-
cent, to $74 million.30 Congress responded by amending the Price-
Anderson Act to extend the federal indemnification program for ten
years, while lowering the federal share to $486 million, so that the
total coverage remained at $560 million.3' In 1966, responding to
criticism that recovery for injuries sustained in a nuclear accident
might be barred in some states in the absence of a showing of fault,
32
Congress amended the Price-Anderson Act to authorize the AEC to
require waiver of certain defenses as a condition of the indemnifica-
tion policy. 33 These waivers are to take effect only upon the declara-
tion by the AEC (now the NRC) of an "extraordinary nuclear
occurence" to prevent nuisance suits.
By 1975, when expiration of the indemnification program
loomed again, the industry had fifty-four operating reactors. The
private insurance available, however, still had reached only $125
million per accident.34 Congress proceeded to extend the program
for another ten years35 and at the same time added a provision for a
"deferred premium system" that would assess operators of reactors
from $2 million to $5 million each 36 in the event of an accident in-
volving liability beyond the limits of commercial insurance. 37 This
mechanism was intended to phase out the government's potential li-
29. See J. FULLER, WE ALMOST LOST DETROIT (1975) [hereinafter cited as WE ALMOST
LOST DETROIT].
30. See H.R. REP. No. 883, 89th Cong., lst Sess., reprinted in (1965) U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3209, 3219 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 883].
31. Act of Sept. 29, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-210, 79 Stat. 855.
32. See S. REP. No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3201, 3203.
33. Act of Oct. 13, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-645, 80 Stat. 891 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)
(1976)). The licensee must waive
(i) any issue or defense as to conduct of the claimant or fault of persons indemnified;
(ii) any issue or defense as to charitable or governmental immunity, and (iii) any
issue or defense based on any statute of limitations if suit is instituted within three
years from the date on which the claimant first knew, or reasonably could have
known, of his injury or damage and the cause thereof, but in no event more than ten
years [this was changed to twenty years by the 1975 Amendments] after the date of
the nuclear incident.
See Trosten & England, Waiping Defenses., A New Approach to Protecting the Public Against
Loss From Use of Atomic Energy, 27 FED. B.J. 27 (1967).
34. 40 Fed. Reg. 7082 (1975) (amending 10 C.F.R. § 140.1 I(a)(4)).
35. Act of Dec. 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-197, 89 Stat. I111 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210(c) (1976)).
36. 42 Fed. Reg. 46 (1977).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b) (1976).
ability under the indemnification program and thus was in keeping
with the congressional intent of 1957.
Federal indemnification ended in April 1983, with the licensing
of the eightieth large nuclear power reactor, 38 with which the poten-
tial federal assessments combined with the $160 million available in
private insurance 39 to equal exactly the $560 million liability cap.
Industry self-indemnification will now expand beyond the former
cap by $5 million for each newly licensed reactor, unless the NRC
reduces the assessment or the number of licensees drops below
eighty. At the same time that it was creating a mechanism to provide
a substitute for formal government indemnification, however, Con-
gress added language hinting that additional federal money would
be made available in some other fashion in the event of an accident
that caused damages exceeding the liability limitation.40
Like federal indemnification, the AEC and the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy have been abolished. First, Congress responded
to long-standing criticism of the AEC's dual role of promoting and
regulating nuclear power4 and adopted the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974,42 which abolished the AEC and assigned its regulatory
duties to the new Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4 ' and its research
and development functions to the Energy Research and Develop-
ment Administration.' The Joint Committee was weakened when
several of its members retired or were defeated in the 1976 congres-
sional elections; its critics then abolished it45 and divided its respon-
sibilities among the House Committees on Interior and Insular
Affairs, Armed Services, Commerce, Foreign Affairs, and Science
38. See U.S. NRC, Licensed Operating Reactors-Status Summary Report, NUREG-
0020, May 1983. By Jan. 1984, this monthly report listed 82 licensed reactors.
39. See 10 C.F.R. § 140.1 l(a)(4) (1983). This still does not appear to reflect a high degree
of confidence in nuclear power on the part of private insurers, which are willing at the same
time, for example, to provide up to $500 million in liability coverage for Pan American Air-
lines. See Wilson, Nuclear Liability and the Price-Anderson Act, 12 FORUM 612 (1977).
40. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
41. See S. REP. No. 980, 93d Cong., 2d Sess, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5470, 5471.
42. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 5801, 5811-5820, 5841-5849, 5891 (1976)). A considerable question exists, however,
about the significance of the change wrought by the Act. Sixty-five percent of the NRC's
senior staff previously were employed by NRC licensees and contractors. A. KNEIER, SERV-
ING Two MASTERS (1976). The Commission remains primarily concerned with promoting the
development of nuclear power. General Accounting Office, Report to the Congress on the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission (1980); M. ROGOVIN, REPORT ON THREE MILE ISLAND (1979).
The Kemeny Commission found the NRC "erring on the side of industry's convenience rather
than carrying out its primary mission of assuring safety." President's Commission's Report,
supra note 1.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 5841(f) (1976). The NRC was created by § 5841(a)(1).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 5814(c) (1976). The ERDA later was absorbed into the Department of
Energy. Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 567 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352 (1976)).
45. Act of Sept. 20, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-110, 91 Stat. 567 (codified in scattered sections
of 2, 31, 42 U.S.C. (1976)).
and Technology and the Senate Committees on Energy and Natural
Resources, Armed Services, and Environment and Public Works.
III. Assessing Nuclear Hazards
In 1957, the AEC released the first comprehensive attempt to
quantify the level of risk associated with the operation of nuclear
power plants.46 The Report concluded that in the highly unlikely
and extreme case of release of all accumulated fission products from
a nuclear plant of the general type and size then contemplated, at a
typical location, as many as 3400 people might be killed and 43,000
injured, while property damage could reach $7 billion. Some mem-
bers of the Joint Committee were convinced in 1964 that an updating
of that study would show that safety advances justified lower esti-
mates of damages from a meltdown accident, and consequently a
lowered limitation on liability in Price-Anderson.47 When the AEC
looked into the question, however, it concluded that increases in
scale had increased risk more than improvements in safety features
had reduced risks. Thus, the estimates were revised upward and pre-
dicted 45,000 deaths, $17 billion in property damage and radioactive
contamination of an area the size of Pennsylvania.48 So that the re-
vised estimates would not fuel anti-nuclear sentiment, they were kept
secret for nearly ten years and finally were released in 1973 as a re-
sult of a Freedom of Information Act request.49
Faced with a public relations disaster, the AEC commissioned
Norman Rasmussen, a nuclear engineering professor at MIT, to di-
rect a staff of sixty specialists in conducting a new study. The result-
ing eighteen volume report5 ° estimated the chance of a catastrophic
nuclear plant accident to be one in one million and predicted the
probable casualties to be 3200 immediate deaths, 45,000 cases of
cancer and 5100 genetic defects. The report also anticipated that
property damage would equal $14 billion. This report was widely
criticized as understating both the actual probability of an accident
and the extent of consequent damages; questions were raised about
the validity of many of the report's basic assumptions and meth-
ods.5 Following a review by a special scientific panel that was ap-
46. AEC, Theoretical Possibilities and Consequences of Major Accidents in Large Nuclear
Power Plants, WASH-740 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Theoretical Possibilities of Major
Accidents].
47. W. Jacks, The Public and the Peaceful Atom. Participation in AEC Regulatory Pro-
ceedings, 52 TEX. L. REV. 466, 470 (1974).
48. AEC, Papers on Update of WASH-740 (1964), unpublished papers on file at the NRC
Public Document Room, Washington, D.C.
49. WE ALMOST LOST DETROIT, supra note 29, at 151-81 (1975).
50. AEC, An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S Commercial Nuclear Power Plants,
WASH-1400 (1975).
51. See, e.g., I. Levi, Assessing Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants:
Scientific Method and the Rasmussen Report, 48 Soc. RESEARCH 395 (1981); Union of Con-
pointed by the new NRC and headed by Dr. Harold Lewis of the
University of California at Santa Barbara NRC endorsement of the
AEC's Rasmussen Report was withdrawn.52
The Oak Ridge National Laboratory was commissioned to con-
duct a new study,53 the first to be based on actual operating experi-
ence. The authors reviewed 19,400 mishaps that occurred from 1969
through 1979 and developed statistical probabilities for various types
of accidents at the then-operating reactors. By integrating the risk
estimates for failure of individual systems, the authors produced an
estimate of the probability of a serious accident occurring during the
period studied to have been one in one thousand years of reactor
operation.5 4  The seventy-four reactors licensed during that period
would have accumulated that amount of operating time every 13.5
years. That figure would be somewhat different today. There have
been improvements in safety features at operating plants because of
the lessons learned at TMI, but more reactors are now in operation.
If the early studies of the risks inherent in operating nuclear
plants, having been based on educated guesses, assumed failure rates
and the likelihood of human error under various known and un-
known circumstances, seem unreliable, consider what the members
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy actually knew from prac-
tical experience even prior to the more empirically reliable Oak
Ridge report. In 1954, for example, when the Joint Committee rec-
ommended the revised Atomic Energy Act as a means of bringing a
vast new atomic industry into being, they knew that a major accident
caused by operator errors had disabled Canada's experimental NRX
reactor on December 12, 1952." In 1957, when they recommended
the Price-Anderson Act as a means of shifting a supposedly very
small risk of very large losses from the nuclear industry to the public,
they not only had the AEC's rather discouraging first safety study
cerned Scientists, The Risks of Nuclear Power Reactors. A Review of WASH-1400, (1977); H.
Lewis, Report to the American Physical Society by the Study Group on Light- Water Reactor
Safety, 47 REVS. OF MOD. PHYSICS 1.
52. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1979, at A-I. The Commission announced that it "does not
regard as reliable the Reactor Safety Study's numerical estimate of the overall risk of a reactor
accident, [that] cogent comments from critics either were not acknowledged or were evaded,
and that, in general, the record of response to valid criticism was weaker than it should have
been."
53. J. Minarick & C. Kukielka, Precursors to Potential Severe Core Damage Accidents:
1969-1979-A Status Report (NUREG/Cr-2497) (1982).
54. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1982, at A-10.
55. See W. LEWIS, THE ACCIDENT TO THE NRX REACTOR ON DECEMBER 12, 1952
(1953). The accident resulted from "a complex concurrence of mechanical defects in the shut-
off system and operating errors." One of the fuel rods burst, and 10,000 curies of fission prod-
ucts from long-irradiated uranium were carried by 1,000,000 gallons of cooling water into the
basement. "Fused masses of highly irradiated uranium and uranium oxide were left inside the
calandria, and the core vessel of the reactor and tubes of the calandria were severely dam-
aged." See also D. HURST, THE ACCIDENT TO THE NRX REACTOR, PART 11 (1964).
before them,56 but they also knew that the AEC's Experimental
Breeder Reactor-I had suffered a suggestive partial meltdown in
1955.57 In 1965, when they recommended extension of Price-Ander-
son for ten years, the Joint Committee's members knew about the
uranium fire and massive release of radiation caused by "inadequa-
cies in instrumentation" in combination with "faults of judgment by
the operating staff. . . attributable to weaknesses of organization"
at the Windscale-1 plant in England in 1957,58 knew that the Cana-
dian NRU reactor had had a partial meltdown and fire in 1958,"9
knew that the AEC's SL- 1 reactor had run out of control and killed
three men in 196160 and knew that the Fermi-1 reactor in Michigan
had had a partial meltdown in 1966 which turned that reactor into a
total economic lOSS. 6 1 In 1975, when they recommended extending
Price-Anderson again, they knew about the fire at Brown's Ferry-1
on March 22, 1975, which extensively damaged the electrical cables
controlling the reactor and caused the emergency core cooling sys-
tem to fail; only the alternative cooling systems prevented a
meltdown of the reactor core. 62 The Joint Committee's reports on the
various bills that brought the American public into the nuclear era
totally fail to come to grips with the implications of these events.63
56. Chairman Strauss of the AEC formally presented the safety study to the Joint Com-
mittee at a hearing on March 25, 1957. See Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy on Governmental Indemnity and Reactor Safety, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1957). The
Joint Committee's report on the Price-Anderson bill discusses risk estimates, with heavy em-
phasis on the improbability of the occurrence of a major accident. See id. at 3 n.26.
57. See AEC, Twentieth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission 45-47
(1956).
58. See United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, Accident at Windscale No. 1 Pile on
10th October, 1957, at 3-4, 14 (1957). The release of radioactivity in this accident was so great
that tests of milk showed unacceptable contamination throughout "a coastal strip approxi-
mately thirty miles long, ten miles broad at the southern end and six miles broad in the north."
Abnormal levels of radioactivity reached London, three hundred miles from the plant. See
WE ALMOST LOST DETROIT, supra note 29, at 87.
59. See J. GREENWOOD, CONTAMINATION OF THE NUR REACTOR IN MAY 1958 (1964).
This accident did not disable the reactor or release large amounts of radiation to the atmos-
phere, but was suggestive of the primitive state of emergency planning at the time; the fire was
extinguished with wet sand. About 40 employees were exposed to radiation doses ranging up
to 19 roentgens while shoveling sand and uranium debris into garbage cans with long-handled
tools in the course of the clean-up.
60. WE ALMOST LOST DETROIT, supra note 29, at 104-16.
61. Id See also Atomic Power Development Associates, Inc., Report on October 5, 1966,
Fuel Damage Incident at the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant (1967).
62. See D. FORD, BROWN'S FERRY: THE REGULATORY FAILURE (1976). The fire
burned for seven and a half hours, destroying 1600 cables.
63. The entire discussion of accidents in the Joint Committee's report on Price-Anderson
is as follows:
In the history of reactor operations there have been three incidents of public notice
involving reactors. Two of these were accidental---the one at Chalk River in Canada
and the one at the experimental breeder reactor at Arco. In both of these, personnel
failure caused damage which was primarily limited to the reactor itself. The third
incident was a deliberate forcing of a small experimental reactor to explosion to study
the effects of such action. In none of these three incidents was there any damage to
any person. The property damage in both of the accidental incidents was essentially
confined to the reactor itself.
IV. Nuclear Delusions and the Legislative Process
President Truman's message to Congress calling for passage of
the original Atomic Energy Act was restrained and business-like. He
viewed atomic energy as a technology with considerable potential for
benefiting the public, and he viewed the scientific and engineering
team that had succeeded in building the atomic bomb as an invalua-
ble national resource that should be held together to explore further
the atom's potential. He proposed, therefore, the continuation of
government research and development in the field to complement
private efforts and advocated a government role in protecting the
public safety; President Truman recognized that atomic energy in-
volved "forces of nature too dangerous to fit into any of our usual
concepts."64 The Senate committee that considered the bill also rec-
ognized the complexity of the task ahead and observed that "the vast
possibilities of utilizing atomic energy as a source of power depend
on (1) further research and development, and (2) study of the eco-
nomic and international implications of the establishment of plants
producing and using fissionable material."65
Thus, Congress created an orderly system of government mo-
nopolization of nuclear fuel and placed in the hands of the AEC the
management of nuclear power research and development. AEC
management was intended to prevail until nuclear plants appeared
capable of operating profitably and became attractive private invest-
ments. The report which would be submitted by the AEC under
section 7(b) was to be the signal for a sober congressional discussion
of the probable consequences of embarking upon the actual com-
mercialization of nuclear power. This reporting and discussion pro-
cess was necessitated by the economic disorganization that could
result when "great industrial installations [were] rendered obsolete"
and by the risk that "devices utilizing atomic energy, if widely used,
would so multiply potential hazards to national health and safety
that even careful Government regulation would fail to provide ade-
quate safeguards."66 The drafters judiciously assured Congress that
the bill "reflects the deliberate judgment of all the committee mem-
bers as to the best instrument they are able to devise in the discharge
of their grave responsibility.
6 7
Although the AEC seems to have proceeded quite competently
S. REP. No. 296, supra note 26, at 2. The reports on the bills renewing the Act fail to even
mention the subsequent accidents.
64. H. Truman, Special Message to the Congress on Atomic Energy, Oct. 3, 1945, PUBLIC
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, HARRY S. TRUMAN, 1945, (1961), at 365, para. 156.
65. S. REP. No. 1251, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1946) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
1251].
66. Id. at 20-21.
67. Id. at 9.
in carrying out its developmental responsibilities under the original
Act,6 8 its political environment changed drastically between 1946
and 1954, primarily because of the highly inflated ideas of what nu-
clear power could accomplish that came to dominate the minds of
key decision-makers and the development of the Cold War. The
scientists and engineers from the Manhattan Project had been tre-
mendously elated by the awesome nature of the power they had har-
nessed, and they were certain that the technical obstacles to
exploitation of the "peaceful atom" could be resolved by the same
sort of team effort that had developed the atomic bomb. They or-
ganized to lobby the federal government for relaxation of the secrecy
and military control that had prevailed in the Manhattan Project and
for an aggressive federal government effort to promote atomic re-
search.6 9 Their enthusiasm quickly captured the imaginations of the
members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the manag-
ers of the AEC and converted them into potent lobbying forces
within both the Congress and the executive branch for a crash effort
to develop nuclear power. The nuclear euphoria reached a peak in
1954, when Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the AEC, predicted that
"our children will enjoy in their homes electrical energy too cheap to
meter,"70 a promise that was repeated innumerable times for many
years.
Still, it must be remembered that the President and Congress
knew in 1954 that nuclear power was not ready for commercializa-
tion. The AEC had not submitted the report required by section 7(b)
and specifically had advised the Joint Committee, in a classified re-
port of July 31, 1953, that the technology was not yet of practical
value.7 When President Eisenhower had made his Atoms for Peace
68. See Reactor Development in First Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion through the Twenty-first Semiannual Report. These little-read reports are dry reading and
convey a touch of naive optimism in retrospect, but they reveal a dogged competence entirely
missing from the Joint Committee's reports.
69. See D. STRICKLAND, SCIENTISTS IN POLITICS-THE ATOMIC SCIENTSITS MOVE-
MENT, 1945-46 (1968); A. SMITH, A PERIL AND A HOPE-THE SCIENTISTS' MOVEMENT IN
AMERICA: 1945-47 (1965). See also R. JUNOK, BRIGHTER THAN A THOUSAND SUNS (1958) for
an account of the historical and psychological background of the politicization of the atomic
scientists. Some of the original atomic scientists have never abandoned their messianic cam-
paign for nuclear power. See, e.g., H. Bethe, The Necessity of Fission Power, 234 Sci. Am. 21
(1976), which relies heavily on the Rasmussen Report and understates the potential contribu-
tion of conservation and solar energy.
70. Speech of Lewis L. Strauss, delivered on Sept. 16, 1954, to the National Association
of Science Writers, N.Y. City, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1954, at 5. The Joint Committee does not
seem to have said anything quite so extravagant, but its claim in the report on the 1954 Act
that "atomic power at prices competitive with electricity derived from conventional fuels [was]
on the horizon," S. REP. No. 1699, supra note 16, at 3, contrasts interestingly with the re-
strained tone of the 1946 Senate report, S. REP. No. 1251, supra note 65.
71. See the sanitized summary in U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
Report on Research and Development on the Five- Year Power Reactor Development Program
Proposed by The Atomic Energy Commission (1954). See also AEC, Fourteenth Semiannual
Report ofthe Atomic Energy Commission 19 (1953).
speech, in December 1953, no power reactor was in commercial op-
eration; indeed, the only one on order, Shippingport, was being
funded primarily by the AEC, and the order had been placed a scant
five months before the speech. Also there was no immediate need
for the precipitous program of nuclear power development de-
manded by the Joint Committee: fossil fuels were plentiful and
abundant at the time and were expected to remain so at least until
1975.72
The Joint Committee was aware of the international implica-
tions that had motivated the Atoms for Peace speech; in 1953, the
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission had stated that the
U.S. position of world leadership was linked directly to nuclear
power development,7 3 and the Deputy Secretary of State had de-
clared that leadership in atomic energy was vital to success in the
propaganda contest with the Soviet Union.74 The Joint Committee
did not emphasize advances in nuclear technology to make nuclear
power competitive with conventional sources as a reason for revising
the 1946 Act, but the need to share military information with U.S.
allies.75 The original, orderly plan for development of nuclear
power thus was sacrificed to the perceived exigencies of the Cold
War and to an almost delirious optimism.
In 1954, the AEC was confronted by the challenge of persuad-
ing the private sector to invest in a technology that everyone knew
was not yet economically competitive with conventional alternatives.
Unabashed, the Commission in January 1955, announced the Power
Demonstration Reactor Program, which would provide governmen-
tal financial incentives to private parties prepared to assume the
technical and economic risks inherent in the construction of nuclear
plants. The Commission invited "proposals from companies or
groups that would be willing to assume the risks of construction,
ownership and operation of reactors designed to demonstrate the
practical value of such facilities for industrial or commercial pur-
72. See supra note 7; Mazuzan & Walker, Atomic Energy and New England- The Report of
the New England Committee on Atomic Energy to the New England Governors' Conference 31-
32 (1955); C. Goodwin, The Truman Administration. Toward a National Energy Policy, and W.
Barker, The Eisenhower Administration: Reluctant Intervention, ENERGY POLICY IN PERSPEC-
TIVE 53-56, 221-28 (C. Goodwin ed. 1981).
73. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Atomic Power Development
and Private Enterprise, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1953) (Statement of Gordon Dean).
74. Id. at 64 (Statement of Walter Bedell Smith). See also Mazuzan & Walker, supra
note 13, at 3. Of course, this conversion of nuclear power to a tool in the Cold War also
produced an extensive international "Atoms for Peace Program" that has been heavily subsi-
dized by the United States. The United States provided India, for example, with loans at
0.75% interest and trained over 1000 Indian scientists, enabling that country to establish a
nuclear power program and to develop its own atomic bomb-and the United States has not
fully extricated itself from involvement to this day. See V. Gilinsky, Why Keep Helping India
Make the Bomb?, Wall St. J., July 5, 1983, at 22.
75. S. REP. No. 1699, supra note 16, at 2-3.
poses."76 This program produced four proposals;" Consolidated
Edison, in New York, and Commonwealth Edison, in Illinois,
placed firm orders for nuclear plants.7" In September 1955, to stimu-
late more private sector interest, the AEC offered to finance nuclear
plants in whole or in part, and this offer produced seven proposals.79
Firm orders were placed for Yankee Station (Massachusetts), Fermi-
1 (Michigan) and Pathfinder (South Dakota).
The case for Price-Anderson thus could not have been based on
the actual experience with private-sector development at the time
that Price-Anderson was passed. Despite the complete lack of evi-
dence that reactors could be operated profitably, there were already
firm orders for six reactors: one federally funded; two privately
funded; and three federally subsidized. Rather, the Joint Committee
decided that some special dispensation was required to encourage
private investment in nuclear power because of what industry
spokesmen had told them they would do if not afforded protection
against liability.
In tones reminiscent of Charles Dickens' industrialists, who al-
ways were ready to "pitch their property into the ocean" if govern-
ment failed to adopt policies sufficiently favorable to their interests,8"
Charles Weaver, Vice-President of Westinghouse, and Francis K.
McCune, Vice-President of General Electric, asserted that their com-
panies would withdraw from the business of manufacturing reactors
if some remedy for their "insurance problem" were not adopted. 8' A
representative of the Edison Electric Institute further asserted that
"no utility company or group of companies will build or operate a
reactor until the [utility's financial] risk of nuclear accidents is mini-
mized."82 Perhaps most significantly, Commonwealth Edison told
the Joint Committee that it would not complete the Dresden- 1 plant
without some such protection. 3 Consolidated Edison, however, said
76. AEC, Seventeenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission xii (1955).
77. AEC, Eighteenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission 42 (1955).
78. Indian Point-i, ordered in February 1955, and Dresden-I, ordered in July 1955. Ex-
cept where otherwise noted, all references in this article to plants ordered, completed or can-
celled are drawn from the author's compilation of AEC and NRC reports and newspaper
accounts.
79. AEC, Twentieth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission 3 8-39 (1956).
The Joint Committee acknowledged that "at this stage in the development of atomic energy
these companies [electric utilities] do not envision any profit for many years from the research
and development efforts that have to be put into the program." S. REP. No. 296, supra note 26,
at 3.
80. C. Dickens, Hard Times.
81. Hearings on Governmental Indemnity, supra note 20, at 47. See Hearings Before the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Governmental Indemnity and Reactor Safety, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. 32 (1957).
82. Id. at 182. (Statement of Elmer L. Lindseth).
83. Id. at 30 (Statement of Harold L. Price).
that it would proceed with Indian Point-I even without relief from
the insurance difficulty.
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V. Due Process and Inherently Dangerous Activities
Twice the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act has been
attacked in the courts. In Conservation Society of Southern Vermont
v. AEC 5 the claim that the Act violated the due process clause of the
fifth amendment was dismissed for lack of justiciability, and the dis-
missal was not appealed. The United States District Court for the
Western District of New York in Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc. v. AEC 6 declared the Act to be unconstitutional, but
subsequently was overruled by the Supreme Court in Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group.7
The lower court opinion in Duke Power Co. held that Price-
Anderson "violates the Due Process Clause because it allows the de-
struction of the property or the lives of those affected by nuclear ca-
tastrophe without reasonable certainty that the victims will be justly
compensated," and that it
violates the equal protection provision that is included within the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it provides
for what Congress deemed to be a benefit to the whole society (the
encouragement of the generation of nuclear power), but places the
cost of that benefit on an arbitrarily chosen segment of society,
those injured by nuclear catastrophe.88
The Supreme Court reversed, answering the district court's due pro-
cess argument that Price-Anderson deprived injured parties of the
reasonable certainty that they would be justly compensated by deni-
grating the ability of the common law to cope justly with the litiga-
tion that would result from a nuclear plant catastrophe. The Court
pointed out that the utility, Duke Power, would not be able to raise
more than $200 million without becoming insolvent and proceeded
to hold that
[alt the minimum, the statutorily mandated waiver of defenses es-
tablishes at the threshold the right of injured parties to compensa-
tion without proof of fault and eliminates the burden of delay and
uncertainty which would follow from the need to litigate the ques-
tion of liability after an accident. Further, even if strict liability
were routinely applied, the common-law doctrine is subject to ex-
ceptions for acts of God or of third parties . . . . All of these
considerations belie the [appellees'] suggestion that the Act leaves
the potential victims of a nuclear disaster in a more disadvanta-
geous position than they would be in if left to their common-law
84. Id. at 102 (Statement of H.R. Searing).
85. No. 19-72 (D.D.C. 1975),reprinted, 121 CONG. REC. S22360 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1975).
86. 431 F. Supp. 203 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
87. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
88. 431 F. Supp. 203, 222, 224-25 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
remedies-not known in modem times for either their speed or
economy.8 9
The Court's perception of the shortcomings of the common law in
dealing with losses from a nuclear accident, however, was not ac-
companied by rigorous examination of the compensation scheme es-
tablished by Price-Anderson. Even with the waivers of defenses that
were added to Price-Anderson in 1966, the Act affords the public less
than satisfactory protection in several ways. First, the waivers are
triggered only upon a declaration by the NRC of an "extraordinary
nuclear occurrence," the congressional understated euphemism for a
nuclear catastrophe. 9° If the NRC refuses to make such a declara-
tion, as it did in the case of the TMI-2 accident, plaintiffs are subject
to all available defenses under state tort law, and the NRC's deter-
mination is unreviewable. 9' The waiver provisions' extension of any
applicable statute of limitations to twenty years also is of dubious
real utility because about five-sixths of the cancers caused by radia-
tion emerge more than twenty years after exposure.9 2 Moreover,
continuing harm may occur from contact with radioactive contami-
nation of the ground and structures for a period of time much later
than twenty years after the original accident. 93 Moreover, the waiv-
ers probably would not make any plant operator responsible for
damage caused by deliberate terrorist acts, like the detonation of a
bomb made from stolen plutonium, occurring off the plant site.
The waivers also do nothing to alleviate the very difficult prob-
lem ofproving causality faced by any plaintiff whose cancer or birth
defect appears years after nuclear exposure. There is no reason at all
to believe that such a plaintiff would find establishment of his claims
under Price-Anderson and its waivers any less difficult than those
veterans suing under common law have found it after they were de-
liberately, if genuinely naively, exposed to large doses of atomic ra-
diation by the United States Army between 1945 and 1962. All but
ten of the many claims by veterans have been rejected for lack of
proof that the injuries had been caused by the exposure.94 If the
Army's willful conduct caused no relaxation of the usual need to
prove causality, it is hard to imagine that an accidental release of
radiation by a nuclear power plant would do so.
Most significantly, however, the waivers fail to correct the radi-
89. 438 U.S. at 91-92.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(j) (1976); the criteria for such a determination are in 10 C.F.R.
§ 140.81-.85 (1983).
91. Abolition of the extraordinary nuclear occurrence threshold has been proposed. See
D. Tousley, Abolishing the Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence Threshold ofthe Price-Anderson
Act, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 609 (1981).
92. Note, Nuclear Power and the Price-Anderson Act." Promotion Over Public Protection,
30 STAN. L. REV. 393, 417 (1978).
93. Theoretical Possibilities of Major Accidents, supra note 46, at 13-19 app. V1.
94. K. SCHRADER-FRECHETrE. NUCLEAR POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY 97-98 (1980).
cal inadequacy of the remedy available under Price-Anderson in the
event of a truly catastrophic accident. Even with the modest in-
creases that might result from the deferred premium system,95 the
available indemnification would fall far short of the potential dam-
age, which, even at the time of passage of the Act,96 was known to
have been several times the $560 million liability ceiling. The $560
million figure was entirely arbitrary. Senator Clinton Anderson, who
originally suggested the figure in the form of $60 million from pri-
vate insurance and $500 million from government indemnification,
summed up his own analytical processes succinctly as follows:
In suggesting $500 million, I was trying to see if we could not get
some figure which would not frighten the country or the Congress
to death and still solve the problem which the producers of parts
face, and which the fabricator of the entire reactor faces, and
which the operator of that reactor would eventually face once he
puts it in operation.97
Since Senator Anderson and his fellow members of Congress estab-
lished this device to promote nuclear power, inflation has progres-
sively reduced the real value of the potential compensation, while
the potential damages have increased enormously with increasing
plant size. The primary effect of Price-Anderson thus remains the
drastic restriction of perhaps the most fundamental tort law princi-
ple: the one who causes the harm is under a dutyfully to compensate
those injured.98
The real heart of the Duke Power decision is the Supreme
Court's conclusion that the liability limitation was a reasonable
means of effecting the congressional intent to encourage the private
development of nuclear power. The Court viewed the risk to the
public as less weighty than the benefits of nuclear power develop-
ment when the risks were "appraised in terms of both the extremely
remote possibility of an accident where liability would exceed the
limitation and Congress' now statutory commitment to 'take
whatever action is deemed necessary and appropriate to protect the
public from the consequences of' any such disaster."99
The Court's sanguine view of the improbability of a nuclear ac-
cident was based on the Rasmussen Report-not surprisingly, since
the NRC did not announce until the year after Duke Power was de-
cided that the absolute probabilities of risk used by that study
95. Supra note 37 and accompanying text.
96. Eisenhower's Public Papers, supra note 14, at 123.
97. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Governmental Indemnity
and Reactor Safety, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1957).
98. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 6, 16-23 (4th ed. 1971). For addi-
tional discussion of the defects in the protection afforded by Price-Anderson, see B. Brauer,
The Price-Anderson. A Constitutional Meltdown of Tort Liability?, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
371 (1981).
99. 438 U.S. at 86.
"should not be used uncritically" for public policy purposes.' 00 Nor
could the Court have known at the time that the best evidence soon
would show that a serious accident in fact was likely to occur, on
average, every 13.5 years.' What is astounding is the comfort that
the Court took in a provision of Price-Anderson that obligates the
federal government to do absolutely nothing in the event of a nu-
clear power plant catastrophe.
The Court made no effort to explain its faith in the ambiguous
congressional pledge to do something unspecified for uncompen-
sated victims of a nuclear catastrophe, but did cite one quotation
from the debate on the 1975 extension of Price-Anderson, to the ef-
fect that the $560 million limitation was intended to be merely a
"starting point" for congressional consideration of appropriate com-
pensation following an accident. 10 2 The Joint Committee in 1975
viewed the addition of the reference to extraordinary relief as merely
making formal what had always been implicit in the Act: that in the
event of a major nuclear accident, the federal government would
have to appropriate public funds to supplement the amount avail-
able from insurance and indemnification. 10 3 The report on the origi-
nal Price-Anderson bill had explained that the drafters' intention
was
to have the Commission determine the amount of financial protec-
tion which the licensee for the reactors must have to protect the
public against nuclear incidents. Beyond the amount of financial
protection that would be required as a condition of the license the
Government would indemnify the reactor operators for sums up
to $500 million. If a runaway reactor should cause any further
damages beyond that, the way was left open for Federal contribu-
tions after further congressional consideration. If the sums avail-
able were not sufficient to take care of all of the damage,
limitation of liability proceedings would be made applicable in
order to provide a ready technique for apportioning the moneys
available among those hurt. "o
The Joint Committee's notion of the workings of congressional con-
sideration of the need for additional relief was based largely on the
federal government's handling of the so-called "Texas City disas-
ter."'0 5 That precedent, however, is less than reassuring when
viewed from the perspective of a potential disaster victim; the com-
100. Supra note 52. The Joint Committee had also relied on the Rasmussen Report's
invalid quantification of the risk of a nuclear disaster in extending Price-Anderson in 1975.
See H.R. REP. No. 648, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2251, 2265 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 648].
101. Supra note 53 and accompanying text.
102. 438 U.S. at 85.
103. H.R. REP. No. 648, supra note 100, at 2262.
104. S. REP. No. 296, supra note 26, at 8-9.
105. The Joint Committee argued that the history of the Texas City incident "bears out"
that Congress would "have to review the problem and take appropriate action." H.R. REP.
No. 883, supra note 30, at 3214.
pensation was very late and, in many cases, fell far short of actual
losses.
The Texas City disaster was a series of fires and explosions in-
volving ammonium nitrate fertilizer, manufactured by United States
government contractors, which destroyed several cargo ships and the
entire dock area of Texas City, Texas, on April 16 and 17, 1947.
More than 300 suits were filed on behalf of the owners of millions of
dollars worth of property destroyed, the more than 3000 people in-
jured and the survivors of the more than 560 people killed. The
United States District Court held the federal government liable for
damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act,' °6 observing that the
"record disclose[d] blunders, mistakes, and acts of negligence, both
of omission and commission, on the part of Defendant, its agents,
servants, and employees, in deciding to begin the manufacture of
this inherently dangerous Fertilizer."''0 7 The federal government had
had enough information
to put Defendant on notice, and if not, then upon inquiry that
would if pursued, have led to knowledge and notice that such Fer-
tilizer which it decided to and began to manufacture was an inher-
ently dangerous and hazardous material, a dangerous explosive,
and a fire hazard. Such facts learned by Defendant pointed to and
showed that such Fertilizer should not be manufactured, in that it
was, under certain conditions and circumstances, most dangerous
to everyone handling it in any way and to the public. Yet Defend-
ant's servants, agents and employees, in whose hands Defendant
had left the matter, negligently went forward in the manufacture,
handling, distribution, shipping, etc. of such Fertilizer.'
0 8
The court concluded: "Clearly such Fertilizer ought never to have
been manufactured. From the beginning on down, it was a danger-
ous commodity and a dangerous nuisance."'
10 9
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a pri-
vate person would not be liable under the circumstances and, in any
event, that the Government was protected from liability by the ex-
ception in the Tort Claims Act for discretionary acts."10  The
Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit decision."' The dissent
by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson and Black argued as follows:
Traditionally, one function of civil liability for negligence is to
supply a sanction to enforce the degree of care suitable to the con-
ditions of contemporary society and appropriate to the circum-
stances of the case. The civil damage. action, prosecuted and
adjusted by private initiative, neither burdening our overworked
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976).
107. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 45-46 (1953) (app., discussing unreported dis-
trict court opinion).
108. Id. at 46.
109. Id. at 47.
110. In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952).
111. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
criminal processes nor confined by the limits of criminal liability,
is one of the law's most effective inducements to the watchfulness
and prudence necessary to avoid calamity from hazardous opera-
tions in the midst of an unshielded populace.' 12
Finally, after all appeals had been exhausted and sixyears after
the disaster, Congress passed legislation providing compensation for
the victims up to $25,000 for a wrongful death, $25,000 for personal
injury and $25,000 for property damage.'13
VI. Nuclear Economics
There are at least two ways to view the economics of nuclear
power. The approach taken by utility executives in deciding whether
to build a nuclear plant typically weighs the direct, known economic
costs of generating power over the lifetime of a nuclear plant against
comparable data for other generating methods. This approach has
its logic, although it tends to undervalue the benefits to customers of
the option of conserving power instead of generating more, and it
neglects certain imponderable costs of nuclear power, like those
stemming from waste disposal and decommissioning. To the extent
that it is useful at all, this approach clearly is applicable only on a
plant-specific basis. Still the approach is used constantly by nuclear
proponents to support their claim that nuclear power in general is a
bargain, as when Sen. John Pastore, Chairman of the Joint Commit-
tee, argued in justification of extension of Price-Anderson in 1975
that utilities with nuclear capacity saved their customers $750 mil-
lion dollars on their 1974 fuel bills.' 14 This statement simply is ab-
surd; the claimed savings are entirely the result of government
subsidies. The calculation of the economic merits of nuclear power
necessarily involves treatment of subsidies as costs to be added to the
utilities' costs before these costs are weighed against the costs of
alternatives.
The nuclear power industry has been subsidized massively
throughout its history. By 1981, the subsidies had totaled at least
$21.1 billion for research and development; $2.5 billion for research
in biology and medicine, education and training, physical research,
and program management; $237.4 million for selected international
programs; $2.49 billion for uranium purchases; $5.5 billion for en-
richment; and $5.6 billion for waste disposal." 5 The total is a stag-
gering $37.4 billion. The Energy Information Administration
112. Id. at 47 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
113. Texas City Explosion Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 84-378, 69 Stat. 707 (1953).
114. 121 CONG. REC. S540960 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1975). Sen. Pastore evidently was rely-
ing on H. Dunham, The Consumers' Stake in Nuclear Power-A Special Survey of Actual Reac-
tor Operation, 95 PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY 19 (April 24, 1975).
115. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Federal Supportfor Nuclear Power- Reac-
tor Design and the Fuel Cycle (1981).
calculates that subsidies for power generation were .47 cents for each
kilowatt hour of nuclear energy generated through 1979; the average
cost to the utility generating a kilowatt hour, exclusive of these subsi-
dies, was 2.22 cents. 1 6 Thus direct federal subsidies account for
about seventeen percent of the apparent cost of nuclear power.
In addition to those direct subsidies, the industry receives gener-
ous income tax subsidies. One study of income tax expenses for
three New York State utilities with nuclear construction programs,
covering a five year period, found tax subsidies to be $363 million
over the life of the plants, more than enough to account entirely for
the economic advantage of nuclear power over coal in the area.
(The primary difference in tax treatment of the two types of plants is
that the tax life of coal plants is fifteen years, while that of nuclear
plants is now ten years.' 17) Without such income tax subsidies, the
levelized cost of generation in New York State between 1990 and
2019 would be expected to be 28.46 cents per kilowatt hour for nu-
clear power and 27.1 cents for coal generation."'
Essentially the same findings have been reported for Penn-
sylvania" 9 and Indiana. 12' Even with continuing subsidies, nuclear
plants now under construction, if completed, are likely to produce
electricity that is twenty to twenty-five percent more expensive than
new coal generation.
12 1
The construction of nuclear power plants reached a feverish
pitch in the late 1960s and early 1970s because of three basic as-
sumptions entertained by electric utility planners: that because of
increased experience and large scale the cost of building nuclear
plants was about to decline; that a capacity factor of about .80 would
be achieved in operation; 22 and that demand growth would con-
tinue at about the historic rate of seven percent. All three assump-
tions proved to be incorrect. Returns to scale and increased
efficiency in the manufacture of reactors have been more than offset
by increased costs imposed by the need to redesign to correct newly
discovered weaknesses and by the need constantly to improve safety
116. Id.
117. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (amending various
sections of 26 U.S.C.).
118. D. Chapman, The Economic Status of Nuclear Power in New York, CORNELL DEPT.
OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS STAFF PAPERS, no. 80-7 (1980).
119. See D. CHAPMAN, K. COLE & M. SLorr, ENERGY PRODUCTION AND SPACE HEAT-
ING: TAXATION, SUBSIDIES AND COMPARATIVE PRICES, OHIO RIVER BASIN ENERGY STUDY
(1980); D. Chapman, Federal Tax Incentives Affecting Coal and Nuclear Power Economics, 22
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features-just to keep the aggregate risk from all nuclear plants con-
stant-as the number of plants has increased. 23 The average capac-
ity factor for all nuclear plants by 1976 still was only .57 and is
probably getting worse because larger plants, like those currently be-
ing licensed, are considerably less reliable than smaller ones. 24 Fi-
nally, partly in response to rising nuclear costs and partly because of
rising oil costs, demand for electricity consistently has failed to meet
the utilities' expectations. After reaching six percent in 1974, de-
mand growth has shrunk steadily; in 1982, demand actually was less
than that for 198 1.125
Faced with these developments and the consequent deteriora-
tion in their bond ratings, electric utilities have cancelled plans for
more than one hundred nuclear plants since 1972, with total losses in
excess of $10 billion.126 Add to these losses the $975 million ex-
pected to be spent in the cleanup of the Three Mile Island-2 reac-
tor,127 the $1.1 billion to clean up the former low-level radioactive
waste disposal site at West Valley, New York, 21 the unknown cost
of establishing permanent low-level radioactive waste disposal
sites 129 and high-level radioactive waste disposal sites nationwide, 3 °
and the cost of nuclear plant decontamination and decommission-
ing, '3 and it is apparent that nuclear power has been a dreadful
123. Supra note 121.
124. Supra note 122.
125. Total demand for electricity declined in 1974 in response to the 1973 oil embargo,
then rebounded to a 6% growth rate in 1976. Demand grew by 5% in 1977, 3.5% in 1978, 2.6%
in 1979, 1.1% in 1980, and 1.4% in 1981. Demand for electricity in 1982 actually declined from
1981 by 2.8%. Demand in January 1983 declined 6.7% from January 1982. Percentages have
been calculated by the author, based on data in U.S. Energy Information Administration,
Monthly Energy Review, various months, table: Sales of Electricity by Class of Service.
126. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Nuclear Plant Cancellations.- Causes, Costs,
and Consequences x (1983). The report includes cancellations through the end of 1982; since
then, Duke Power Co. has cancelled its Cherokee-I unit and will experience a loss of more
than $565 million. See Wall St. J., May 2, 1983, at 12. The EIA report lists another 12 prob-
able cancellations, involving losses of $ 3 to $4 billion and five more plants that could be
cancelled, with losses of $6.5 to $8 billion. Washington Public Power Supply System-3, which
is not even listed as a possible cancellation, now appears likely to be cancelled, with more
billions of dollars to be lost.
127. Phila. Inquirer, Feb. 2, 1983, at 3-5.
128. See West Valley Demonstration Project Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-368, 94 Stat.
1347. The federal government is paying 90%, and the State of New York is paying 10%.
129. See Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347
(1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2021(d) (1976), which gives the states until Jan. 1, 1986, to enter
into interstate compacts or individually to create disposal sites. See also H. Linker, R. Beers &
T. Lash, Radioactive Waste. Gaps in the Regulatory System, 56 DEN. L.J. 1 (1979); D. Hansell,
The Regulation of Low-Level Nuclear Waste, 15 TULSA L.J. 249 (1980).
130. See Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (to be codi-
fied as 42 U.S.C. § 10101), which calls for the designation of two permanent repositories by
1987 and 1990, following a complex series of reviews, tests, public hearings, environmental
assessments and consultations with state and local officials. Costs are to be borne by consum-
ers of nuclear power; as a first step in that direction, a user fee of I mill per kilowatt hour is
established. See also S. Flax, Radioactive Waste Management, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 259
(1981). This article contains a useful description of the entire nuclear fuel cycle. .
131. See J. Seflik, Decommissioning Commercial Nuclear Reactors, 81 TECH. REV. 56
investment for electric utilities, their customers and the nation as a
whole.
The only possible rationale for Price-Anderson's limitation on
liability is that Price-Anderson is needed for the nuclear industry to
operate, so that it can deliver electricity much cheaper than that de-
rived from alternative sources. 32 In fact, however, nuclear power
has been a dreadful investment for electric utilities, their customers,
and the nation as a whole. Ironically, Price-Anderson has contrib-
uted directly to making nuclear power uneconomic-to the fustra-
tion of its own objective. By insulating electric utilities from the
adverse consequences of a nuclear accident, the Act made possible
the over-commitment to an untested technology which is ending
with at least $10 billion in cancellation costs.
With its economic rationale thoroughly discredited, however,
the liability cap is nothing more than an arbitrary transfer of risk
from utilities to the innocent public and thus serves no legitimate
public purpose.
VII. Conclusion
The federal government's rather single-minded attempt to promote
nuclear power was thus born of a curious mixture of optimism and
paranoia. Nuclear power has never been required to meet a rigorous
cost-benefit test; it depends on the imposition of an extraordinary
amount of risk upon people who happen to live near nuclear plants,
and it has consistently failed to produce promised gains while deliv-
ering instead extraordinary losses. It is long past time, therefore, for
Congress to reconsider its assumptions about nuclear power, and es-
pecially the Price-Anderson cap on liability for a nuclear accident.
Repeal of the liability limitation should be accompanied by
measures to improve the protection afforded to the public by the cur-
rent system of waivers of defenses, and at the same time may necessi-
tate other changes to avoid unnecessary hardships for the operators
of existing nuclear plants.
In extending Prince-Anderson in 1975, Congress required the
NRC to prepare a report "concerning the need for continuation or
(1979); J. Ferguson, A Casefor Funding Nuclear Plant Decommissioning Cost, 82 POWER ENGI-
NEERING 53 (1978).
132. For example, former Congressman Chet Holifield asserted in 1974 that Price-Ander-
son was in the public interest because the public "get the benefit of the cheaper kilowatts which
they are now getting in relation to the fossil fuel fired production plant." See Hearings Before
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Possible Modocation or Extension of the Price-Ander-
son Insurance and Indemnity Act of1957 in Orderfor Proper Planning of Nuclear Poawerplants to
Continue without Delay, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Hearings].
Congressman John Young claimed in 1976 that "you can produce electricity by nuclear facili-
ties at a sharp reduction in cost in the long run." Hearings to Consider Whether Financial Risk
to Utilities Under the Prince-Anderson System Should be Increased, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9
(1976).
modification of' the Act, to be submitted by August 1, 1983.'1 The
NRC's report offers a highly original suggestion that might well be
the starting point for a comprehensive overhaul of the Act tf Con-
gress concludes that some continuing protection for the nuclear in-
dustry is needed. The proposal is that the absolute liability cap be
eliminated, the maximum retrospective premium per reactor per nu-
clear incident be changed to a maximum annual premium, and any
excess liability be carried over from year to year until satisfied.'34
This would provide full compensation, though not necessarily
prompt relief. It would also provide a mechanism for the nuclear
industry to assimilate the new burden of covering the risks that it
creates without being suddenly saddled with a nearly infinite poten-
tial liability. Like all compromises, the idea is less than fully satisfy-
ing, but it would be a big improvement over the status quo. The
NRC proposal, however, is only a part of the answer to the issues
that Price-Anderson presents. The following are some additional
changes that should be considered:
1. Operator liability. Professor Harold Green proposed in
1973 that the operator of the plant at which a nuclear accident occurs
be responsible for some portion of the damages before the indemnifi-
cation takes over, as an incentive to safe operation. 135  The Joint
Committee rejected this idea, apparently because it thought that Pro-
fessor Green's suggested figure of $25 million in operator liability
was too small to affect the behavior of nuclear plant operators.
136
The Joint Committee never addressed the Professor's primary point,
that some level of liability would be sufficient to induce utilities to
put a higher value on safe operation or perhaps to compel their in-
surance companies to exert pressure on them. 137 Congress should
133. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976).
134. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, The Price-Anderson Act-The Third Decade
NUREG 0957, I-1 through 1-5 (1983).
135. See H. Green, Nuclear Power.- Risk, Liability, and Indemnity, 71 MICH. L. REV. 479
(1973); 1974 Hearings, supra note 132 (Statement of Professor Green).
136. See id. at 60 (Statements of F. Grad and L. Rockett.)
137. Several scholars have argued that adequate financial incentives would operate more
efficiently to induce the desired behavior than prescriptive government regulation. WILLIAM
WOOD, INSURING NUCLEAR POWER: LIABILITY, SAFETY, AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 27-42
(1982). One can readily imagine that the standard of care exercised by a number of utilities
could be improved by adequate financial incentives when one considers some of the cases in
which NRC corrective action has been required: faulty welds and doctored x-rays at Niagara
Mohawk's Nine Mile Point No. 2 (Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1982, at 10); shoddy electrical systems
and intimidation of electrical inspectors at Illinois Power Co.'s plant at Clinton, Ill. (Wall St.
J., Oct. 13, 1982, at 49); construction of Pacific Gas & Electric's Diablo Canyon plant danger-
ously close to a geological fault, with key safety features installed backwards (Wall St. J., Aug.
11, 1982, at 1); plant operator cheating on examinations at Metropolitan Edison's TMI-I
(Phila. Inquirer, Nov. 10, 1982, at 8-B); falsification and destruction of records and harassment
of quality control inspectors at Cincinnati Gas & Electric's Zimmer plant (Wall St. J., Nov. 12,
1982, at 14); the punitive discharge of employees who had pointed out safety violatiotis at Tex.
Power & Light's Commanche Peak and at La. Power & Light's Waterford-3 (N.Y. Times,
either establish, by competent evidence, that nuclear safety is unre-
lated to potential liability or empower the NRC to set a level of op-
erator liability above the available insurance, which will be sufficient
to induce safe operation.
2. The extraordinary nuclear occurrence threshold The record
is devoid of any explanation of why the nuclear industry is entitled
to special protection from nuisance suits, and the NRC's failure to
declare the TMI-2 accident an extraordinary nuclear occurrence sug-
gests that the provision operates as a protection against legitimate
claims. Congress should abolish it unless the industry can show
some compelling reason for its continuation, in which case the Act
should specify a much lower threshold than the one currently in the
NRC regulations. A bill currently before the Congress would elimi-
nate the threshold altogether.
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3. Timeliness of deferred premium payments. The adequacy of
the unfunded reserve concept incorporated in the deferred premium
system has been questioned because it may not generate sufficient
funds to deal with the expenses of nuclear accident victims in the
first weeks following an accident. 139  Congress should consider
whether to require nuclear plant operators to maintain some portion
of the deferred premium as a highly liquid investment that would be
readily available following an accident.
4. Manufacturer liability. Manufacturers, suppliers and con-
tractors currently receive the advantages of indemnification under
Price-Anderson without sharing in the cost. Congress should con-
sider including them in the retrospective premium plan or excluding
them from protection.
5. Government expenditures. Price-Anderson should be
amended to explicitly permit federal, state, and local government
agencies to recover their expenditures for dealing with a nuclear ac-
cident from the indemnification pool.
6. Compensation for latent injuries. Congress should repeal the
current twenty year statute of limitations and replace it with a simple
requirement that claims be brought within three years of discovery
of damage caused by a nuclear accident. 4 ° This change, in conjunc-
tion with the NRC staff's proposal for eliminating the liability cap,
Nov. 16, 1982, at A-16); and inadequate soil compaction causing premature settling of Con-
sumers Power Co. of Mich.'s Midland plant (N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1982, at A-16).
138. S. 1500, H.R. 3277, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
139. See 1974 Hearings, supra note 132, at 256 (Statement of Ann Roosevelt).
140. This change was included in H.R. 6390, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
would permit provable claims to be paid as they arise. This still
leaves the problem of proving causality for latent cancers. A repre-
sentative of Friends of the Earth proposed in 1974 that compensa-
tion for latent injuries be based on exposure to radiation, rather than
on actual injury.' 4' This is an unsatisfactory solution, because it
would tend to over-compensate persons who would never actually
develop cancer and under-compensate those who would. It might be
preferable to compensate members of the exposed population who
develop injuries arguably caused by radiation based on a fraction
corresponding to the statistical probability that the injury arose from
the nuclear accident.' 42 Members of the indemnification pool could
then be billed for the amounts of actual obligations incurred, as they
became known.
The first imperative for reform of the Price-Anderson Act is the
creation of a system which will provide full compensation for victims
of a nuclear accident. This requires that the cap on liability be re-
pealed. Substitution of a larger amount for the present inadequate
figure, even if it would experience incremental increases resulting
from the licensing of new plants, would not eliminate the fundamen-
tal unfairness of arbitrarily prohibiting recovery over a specific
amount. Moreover, this increased liability, which is an economic
cost of providing electricity through nuclear fission, should be borne
by the nuclear industry, its insurers and its consumers, not by tax-
payers. 143 Nuclear power no more deserves to have the public un-
derwrite its risks than any other consumer good or raw material
produced by American industry. In the course of shifting risk from
the public to the industry, Congress should strive to create an ade-
quate financial incentive for the safe operation of nuclear plants and
should adapt the existing waivers of defenses to provide enhanced
protection for potential plaintiffs.
141. See 1974 Hearings, supra note 132, at 256 (Statement of Ann Roosevelt).
142. Risk-based fractional recoveries have also been proposed for persons who may have
been harmed by chemical wastes. See Note, Allocating the Costs of Hazardous Waste Disposal,
94 HARV. L. REV. 584, 600.
143. See also H.R. 6390, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
